GUNS, POWER AND POLITICS

RESEARCH PAPER

Extractivism, Militarisation and Violence against Women in Mozambique
Background to Guns, Power and Politics

WoMin and its partners – Centre for Natural Resource Governance (CNRG) in Zimbabwe, Justiça Ambiental (JA) in Mozambique, and Network Movement for Justice and Development (NMJD) in Sierra Leone – jointly undertook this feminist political economy research in 2018. The aim of the research is to inform national network formation, support women’s organising, trauma intervention and justice efforts by addressing the intersection of extractivism, militarisation, securitisation and violence against women.

When the research was commissioned, WoMin and its partners were clear that it would draw on formal academic analysis, research reports and reports written by non-governmental organisations (NGOs). Interviews with key personnel working in NGOs or leading community organisations would be conducted, but there would be no primary fieldwork involving affected or potentially affected women. We adopted this position for a number of reasons:

(a) Women who have endured violence perpetrated by private security and the military have rarely spoken about this experience and so there is deep unaddressed trauma; and

(b) The terrain of work is extremely risky and there is need for careful process to enable women to think through risks and consequences to speaking out about the violence.

An extractive research process would likely cause further trauma and harm to the women we have elected to serve as an alliance. The researchers, bar one, respected this boundary.

The research was undertaken in Zimbabwe, Sierra Leone and Mozambique, and informs a conceptual synthesis paper which draws key conclusions from the research and builds critical concepts and ideas about the relationship between extractivism, securitisation, militarisation and violence against women. The research has been translated into a community activist resource tool for information and consciousness-raising in each of the three countries.
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Military, broadly understood as the deliberate, continued and organised use of physical force and other military tactics to enforce state policies, is a key concern for feminist scholars and activists.

States and corporations, acting independently or in coordination with each other, deploy private security firms, the police and/or the military, to threaten, discipline, criminalise, and control women and other marginalised groups that resist predatory policies or challenge corporate impunity.¹ Extractivism encroaches on women’s rights and autonomy. Feminist activists have argued that there is an intrinsic relationship between the extractives-based capitalist model of development, the militarisation of occupied territories and violence against women.² Thus, understanding the nature of militarisation, linked to extractivism, and its concrete impacts on the lives of women is an important step not only in the fight for gender justice, but also in the resistance against capitalism. This model of accumulation is predicated on violence, the devaluation of women’s bodies and nature, and the eradication of forms of life that are not aligned with the profit motive.

This paper surveys the literature on the socio-political effects of the expansion of the mining sector in Mozambique, paying particular attention to the nature of militarisation and securitisation of mining activities and how this might affect power relations between mining corporations, the Mozambican state, and women in mining-affected communities. The insights provided are based on findings from extensive desktop research, supplemented by six key-informant interviews conducted with members of Mozambican civil...

² See Mies, Manu, and Vandana Shiva (1993).
society organisations, as well as observations from visits to three mining-affected communities in Tete Province.

The research finds that the broad social, economic and environmental impacts of Mozambique’s extractives expansion have been well documented and that some research is available on the gendered impacts of extractivism in mining-affected communities. However, there is a substantial gap in the literature which addresses how securitisation and militarisation around corporate mining interests impact mining-affected communities and women in particular.

Investigations point to a variety of ways in which communities have been impacted by the deployment of public and private security apparatuses to protect mining interests. Specifically, over-policing, surveillance, home-invasions, systematic and arbitrary body searches, as well as constraints on free movement and collective meetings between the community and ‘outsiders’. There is some indication that women face different challenges, particularly to do with sexualised violence, though the sensitive nature of these issues limits the extent of the information available, and ethical concerns hindered this research from investigating this matter further with the affected communities. The work to address trauma and document experiences is the subject of the next phase of work.

The rest of the paper (following section 1 – the introduction) is organised as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of the development of mineral extractivism in Mozambique, looking at the changing importance of the sector and the shifts in the state’s development ideology as reflected in national laws and policies. Section 3 analyses the political economy of extractivism in the Mozambican context. Section 4 highlights the changing power dynamics between the state, private corporations and mining-affected communities. Section 5 provides insights to some of the ways in which the militarisation of mining has impacted communities, and women in particular. Finally, Section 6 concludes and proposes avenues for future research.

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3 The interviews were conducted between June and August 2018, with representatives of the different Mozambican’s civil society that do work related to extractivism, including Justiça Ambiental (JA), the Centro para Integridade Pública (CIP), União Nacional dos Camposes (UNAC), Hikone Moçambique, and the Centro de Estudos Africanos da Universidade Eduardo Mondlane.

4 Though these visits aided the researcher’s insights, due to WoMin’s internal ethical procedures the location of specific communities or information shared by the community members could not be used for the purposes of this research.

5 For example, Justiça Ambiental’s various publications.

6 See Osório, Conceição & Teresa Cruz e Silva, 2017. Corporações Econômicas e Expropriação: Raparigas, Mulheres e Comunidades Reassentadas no Distrito de Moatize.
Families enclosed within the working mine or who live close to the mine once mining operations start, suffer ill health as the air around them is thick with black smoke from mine explosions, and their rivers are polluted by mine waste.
The history of mineral extractivism in Mozambique can be traced to the colonial period, in line with the late colonial interest in new forms of accumulation based on extraction of natural resources and exploitation of labour.7

As early as the fourth decade of the 20th century, coal was an important contributor to the colonial economy, particularly in the town of Moatize, Tete Province, where some initial coal reserves were found.8 Between the 1950s and the 1960s, at the time of the discovery of abundant natural gas reserves, mining of aluminium also took place at a small scale in different parts of the country.9

At independence in 1975, there was a brief rupture with the colonial extractive’s agenda. For Samora Machel’s post-colonial socialist government, agriculture was the focus of economic policy while mining, particularly of coal and aluminium, was thought of as a catalyst for industrialisation and remained limited in scale and nature until the mid-1980s. At the time, the Empresa Nacional de Carvão de Moçambique (CARBOMOC), the state-owned coal mining enterprise, was the principal extractives project in the country. Its activities were essentially conducted underground,10 which explains the reduced environmental impact of the extraction on people’s daily lives.

At the end of the 1980s, the Mozambican government made a significant shift to a market-based economy with a neoliberal focus through its acceptance of structural adjustment programmes initiated under the auspices of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Attracting foreign direct investment through deregulation, elimination of barriers to free trade, and privatisation of publicly held natural resources (land, water, forests) became the emphasis of government development policy. With the detection of ample (potentially the world’s biggest) coal

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8 Tivane, Nelson. Undated. Ibid.
10 Castel-Branco, Carlos Nuno (2010). Ibid.
2. DEVELOPMENT OF THE EXTRACTIVE SECTOR

deposits at the turn of the century, extractivism, and mining in particular, gained prominence in the state’s discourse, often touted as the sector offering the most possibilities for economic growth, development and poverty-reduction.

Multinational extractives corporations started operating at the turn of the 21st century. In the year 2000, in what became a turning point in the Mozambican extractives experience, the government granted Sasol, the South African oil and gas giant, the first concession for the extraction of natural gas in the coastal province of Inhambane. In the 18 years since, Mozambique has seen exponential growth in the number of projects extracting a wide range of mineral resources including coal, mineral sands, gold, and rubies.

Between 2004 and 2012, the government negotiated mineral concessions with large multinational mining companies for projects throughout the country. In 2007, Brazilian-owned Vale started operating the first privately-owned coal mine in the Moatize district, expected to produce some of the world’s most valuable natural coal. Not long after, Riversdale (Australia), Rio Tinto (Britain-Australia), the International Coal Ventures Private Limited (ICVL) (India) and Jindal Africa (India), among others were given permissions to extract coal in different parts of the Tete Province. In 2007, Irish-owned Kenmare was granted a concession for the extraction of mineral sands in Moma, Nampula Province. In 2011, in another hallmark case, British-owned Montepuez Ruby Mining was given a concession to mine the world’s most valuable rubies in Nyamanhunbir, Cabo Delgado Province.

The National Mining Registry provides a geographical account of the current mining projects and interests in the country. According to the National Mining Registry, about half of Mozambique’s territorial land area has been earmarked for extractives activity, with the bulk of concessions and prospection licences clustered in the northern and central parts of the country. This is not surprising given that Mozambique’s National Development Strategy (NDS) for 2015 – 2030, inspired by the African Union’s Agenda 2025, prioritises industrialisation as a means for achieving economic growth and broad-based development.

Along with manufacturing, transport and communications, water, energy and construction, the extractives sector is expected to play a significant role in achieving the country’s development goals. Priority investments include coal mining in Moatize (Tete) as well as the extraction of natural gas, mineral sands and gemstones in other provinces.

Substantial investments made in the sector, both in terms of infrastructure (mining-supportive infrastructure accounts for 1.3% of total spending in 2018) and laws and policies, aim to attract and regulate foreign investment in the sector. The Mozambican Parliament approved the country’s first Mining Law in 2002. However, due to the rapid growth of the sector, and the need to take into account rapid changes in the economy, combined with pressures from civil society groups in relation to the conditions of mining-affected areas, the law was revised, leading to the enactment of a new Mining Law in 2014.

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12 DW (2013). Ibid.
13 Interview with Fatima Mimbire, Centro para a Integridade Pública (CIP), June 2018.
2. DEVELOPMENT OF THE EXTRACTIVE SECTORE

There are many ways in which the new law compares favourably to its predecessor. It not only makes provisions for local content in hiring and procurement, and more transparency in access to mining contracts, but it also, and most importantly, makes provisions for the involvement of mining-affected communities in negotiations for the companies’ right to use and benefit from state land known as Direito do Uso e Aproveitamento da Terra (DUAT) as well as in the definition of the terms for compensation in case of relocation or expropriation. It is important to remember that there is no private ownership of land in Mozambique. Land and its associated resources are the property of the State and rights of use must therefore be acquired through the DUAT. The Mining Law (2014) also stipulates that a proportion of the royalties, later defined to be 2.5%, has to be channelled to the development of the communities where the mining operations are located.

However, critics have pointed out that since the new mining law does not apply retroactively, it leaves out of scrutiny all the country’s key mining projects that were approved before 2014. Additionally, in terms of the fiscal provisions, the new mining law actually maintains unchanged, or even reduces, the royalty payments in comparison to the previous law. Government has justified these royalties’ levels as necessary in order to ensure mining corporations are not discouraged from investing in the country. However, this disadvantages mining-affected communities. The lower royalties also mean a smaller pool of state resources to invest in much needed public infrastructure, schooling and health. This shows government’s clear bias in protecting the interests of mining corporations at the expense of the development of the country and of mining-affected communities in particular. With regards to the 2.5% of royalties which are allocated to mining-affected communities, it has been noted that funds continue to be paid to the central district, so that in many cases, funds do not reach the actual affected communities.
Impunity is rife in the extractive sector. Beyond corruption, tax avoidance and evasion are also real concerns.
The rapid growth of the extractives sector in Mozambique resulted in a deep re-structuring of the economy, making it overly dependent on the extractives sector as a source of government revenues.

This has been reflected in the increasing share of the extractives sector in the Gross Domestic Product (GDP): In 2006, the extraction of minerals and gas exploration accounted for 1.5% of GDP, but ten years later this share increased to 3.5%. By 2016, mining and other forms of extraction contributed to 30% of exports and 20.6% of government revenue. Between 2005 and 2010, Mozambican public debt averaged around 50% of GDP. By 2011, the debt stock was at a record low of 37% of GDP.

The generalised optimism created by the expected high returns from coal mining, led to a quick expansion of the national budget, and the country observed recurrent deficits financed by the negotiation of internal and external government-backed loans. The discoveries of natural gas along the coast increased confidence in the government’s ability to repay debt and led to a new surge of loan agreements. This also opened the way to the further corruption and erosion of state institutions.

Among the new loan agreements was the now infamous case of loans contracted by three maritime security companies, namely Empresa Moçambicana de Atum (Ematum), Prolindicus and Mozambique Asset Management (MAM), associated with the State Intelligence and Security Service (SISE).

Shortly after they were created, these companies contracted large government-backed loans from two foreign banks (Credite Suisse and VTB Capital) allegedly for the purposes of obtaining naval equipment and a fishing fleet. The loans negotiation

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16 https://eiti.org/mozambique
bypassed parliament and did not follow the legal defense procurement system, and were only disclosed when the companies were unable to repay the loans. In 2013, the Mozambican government announced that USD 350 million of the USD 850 million loan to Ematum was transferred to the Defense Budget. At the end of 2013, the official debt figure stood at 48% of GDP.

At the time, Mozambican and international civil society organisations had been raising concerns about the legitimacy of loans made to the SISE companies, given the exorbitant values of the contracts and the fact that the loans were destined for questionable military uses as opposed to investment in social sectors.

Between 2000 and 2014, military expenditure grew exponentially, tripling from USD 55 billion in 2000 to USD 173 billion in 2014. While expenditure on disarmament of the population and transfers to military families constituted a significant portion of this amount, investment in new armaments, like the loans made to SISE companies also played a substantial role.

Following the slump in global commodity prices, the Mozambican government started negotiating new loans with the IMF. As part of the intervention, the IMF requested disclosure of the existing debt. Only at this stage did it start to emerge that the actual debt amount was likely higher than the official figures were acknowledging. In April 2016, the IMF announced that Mozambique’s hidden debt was well above USD 1 billion, and included USD 500 million of the total USD 2 billion which had been lent by Credit Suisse and VTB to the SISE companies and which could not be accounted for. By the end of the year, debt levels had reached unsustainable levels standing well above GDP.

In what is widely acknowledged as an “illegitimate, immoral and illegal” scheme involving high-ranking officials in the FRELIMO government, the Mozambican debt crisis and the related rapid expansion of, and over-reliance on the extractives sector, have accentuated some of the governance challenges. Chief among these are corruption and erosion of trust in the state institutions which are supposed to protect the interests of people.

The Centre for Public Integrity (CIP) has estimated the annual cost of corruption in Mozambique between USD 500 million and USD 4.9 billion. In 2017, Afrobarometer reported that 62% of Mozambicans perceive that some, most or all government officials are corrupt. The perceptions are justified, since, over the years, Mozambican private media and civil society organisations have exposed several cases of corruption involving high-profile political figures in government. The 2018 assaults on two journalists that criticised the government’s handling of the debt crisis have confirmed the tendency of the state and ruling party to violently persecute those who seek to combat fraud and impunity.

In a study of corruption in the extractives sector,
CIP showed that the centralisation of concessions and licenses at the Ministry of Mineral Resources and Energy, as well as the discretionary power afforded to mining cadastre officials create perverse incentives as officials can be easily influenced to speed up approval processes or bypass legal procedures in exchange for private gains.\textsuperscript{26} Mining companies which are structured to benefit members of the Mozambican political elite are particularly guilty of this corruption of legal and policy procedures. As CIP notes, many of these companies fail to even enter the stage of production, evidencing a priori lack of financial or technical capability to carry out the activities, issues which were overlooked during the license-approval stage. Additionally, mining authorities show little interest or capacity, or both, in following up the cases of conflict of interest that are regularly reported in the media or by civil society organisations.

Impunity is rife in the extractives sector. Beyond corruption, tax avoidance and evasion are also real concerns. One notorious case is that of Montepuez Rubi Mining, where CIP had repeatedly raised concerns over the amounts of royalties paid to the Mozambican state from the sale of rubies, as these were consistently below the expected amounts. In 2014, the Mozambican state reportedly received only 50% of the expected USD 7.8 million in royalties from the company.\textsuperscript{27} A similar discrepancy was noted in 2015, and even though the amount increased in 2016, it was still well below what was legally required. CIP also contends that since the Mozambican government does not have an adequate mechanism to check the quality of the gemstones extracted, it is also possible that they are worth more than what the company reports. Aggravating this situation, the Panama Papers scandal highlighted that a substantial share of royalty payments linked to the extraction of rubies never actually enters government coffers nor does it get to the communities the rubies come from, being misdirected instead into a network of clandestine operations protected by the secrecy of offshore fiscal paradises.\textsuperscript{28}

What emerges from this analysis is that the development of the extractives sector has resulted not only in a re-structuring of the economy but, more importantly, of a reframing of the role of the state and its relationship with people who live within its national boundaries. Over the last two decades, mining companies emerged as powerful players in the economic and political milieu, collaborating, but also competing with the political elites in their endeavour to profit from Mozambique’s natural resources. As put by Mozambican economist Carlos Nuno Castel Branco: “The main question is not that the state relented its functions, but that it made its mission to serve the development of capital”.\textsuperscript{29}

In effect, whereas at independence the model of economic development was concerned primarily with the delivery of broad-based development through agriculture and public provision of social services, in line with the socialist aspirations of Samora Machel, there has been a marked shift towards the extractivist mode of development.
Not only do communities lose the land, their main means of subsistence, but they also lose access to natural resources such as water and forests.
In the scheme of power relations, mining-affected communities remain peripheral, despite being the ones directly affected by the extractive activity and the ones mostly penalised by the collusion of the state’s interests with those of the mining companies.

They continue to be mired in poverty, missing even the most basic services such as access to health care, education, jobs, while at the same time suffering the adverse social and environment impacts of having mines on their doorstep. This is the case with coal-mining companies Vale and Rio Tinto, whose operations in Moatize, Tete Province, have resulted in visible air pollution that puts at risk the wellbeing of the communities, compounded by the failed relocation and compensation of at least 1,900 families.30

There are also several instances of government granting corporations the DUAT,31 that is, the right to use and benefit from state land, without prior consultation with communities. This weakens the community’s ability to negotiate the terms of relocation and compensation, let alone exercise their right to say no to the mining project. The failure to involve communities in decision-making about extractive projects is commonplace. For instance, when the Montepuez Ruby Mining Company started negotiating with the community of Nyamanhubir in the Cabo Delgado Province it already had the DUAT, rendering the discussions meaningless and without any authority.32

Where negotiations with the community are carried out, unequal power dynamics result in communities often accepting or being coerced to accept inadequate compensation. Because many communities approached by mining corporations face high levels of poverty and underdevelopment, they find the promises made by companies (of jobs and the development of social infrastructure) appealing. The state, at both the central and local levels, legitimises these promises and presents mining as the only possibility for the development of communities. Communities are told that if they grant companies the right to use the land, they will eventually recoup the gains through jobs, public services and in general better standards of living.

For the majority of mining-affected communities most of those promises are never fulfilled. Not only do communities lose the land, their main means of subsistence, but they also lose access to natural resources such as water and forests. They also experience delays in the relocation and compensation process resulting in some families becoming enclosed within the mine or living in close proximity to it. This results in exposure to the health hazards created by the mine, leading to compromised health and wellbeing, realities aggravated by the lack of public health facilities. Photos of the village of Moatize, Tete, often show the air thick with black smoke emanating from the explosions in the Jindal coal mine, which has also led to the pollution of the river which the communities use as a source of water. In the community of Nangonha, Nampula Province, mineral sand mining by Chinese-owned Hainyu Mining has caused floods that inundated the

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30 Osório, Conceição & Teresa Cruz e Silva (2017). Corporações Económicas e Expropriação: Raparigas, Mulheres e Comunidades Reassentadas no Distrito de Moatize.
31 Direito do Uso e Aproveitamento da Terra (DUAT) – right of use and tenure in terms of the land law. DUATs allow their holders to use the land for authorised purposes set out in the law.
32 Interview with Flaida Macheze, UNAC, August 2018.
village, caused the destruction of 48 houses, the partial destruction of 173 houses and left close to 300 people without housing.33

There are also unmet expectations with regards to the provision of jobs. Most employment offered at the mines are technical positions, requiring a level of specialised training that many community members do not have due to their limited access to education. Corporations are also reluctant to invest in trainings, such that very few community members are contracted, and when they are it is usually for low-skilled and physically demanding tasks.

In communities where artisanal mining contributed historically to the subsistence of many families, such as ruby mining in Nyamayumbir and gold mining in Namajuba (Nampula Province), the arrival of mining corporations displaced farmers and marginalised artisanal miners by confining their activity within and around the perimeter of the mines.

When communities are relocated, as was the case with the families moved by Vale and Rio Tinto, their conditions in the new areas are adverse. The new houses often do not have the same standards as the old ones, the ground is inappropriate for farming, there is inadequate social infrastructure and the relocation sites are far from the main towns and cities where alternative employment opportunities might be available. This is the case, for example, with the communities of Cateme and Malaudizi, respectively located 40 and 44 kilometres from the city of Tete.

In instances where the community is reluctant to concede, or where their interests are divided, community members – often traditional leaders – will collude with government and corporations, sanctioning the mining projects in the name of the community without consulting the rest of the community members.

It is worth noting that these experiences are shared by communities affected by other types of extractivism, including agribusiness, commercial fishing, wood extraction, among others. A telling example is that of many small-scale farmers along the Nacala Corridor in the Northern region of Mozambique who have been removed from the lands that guarantee their livelihoods in order to accommodate the interests of “green” and agribusiness corporations.34 As of 2016, around 1.4 million hectares in this region had been occupied by at least 38 different companies, most of them foreign-owned, in dispute with the farming families about their right to the land as well as access to other resources.

Women across Africa suffer disproportionately the adverse effects of mining.35 Mozambique is not an exception. As discussed above, the major share of mining projects are concentrated in the north and central parts of the country, mostly rural provinces, where communities depend on their access to land, water and forests to provide and care for their families. Formal education levels remain low in these provinces, particularly for women, with an average illiteracy rate of 72% as compared to nearly 43% of men.36

While men are also affected by the same skill limitations, they face little restraint on movement, such that, when opportunities for work and livelihoods contract in mining-affected

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communities, men will often migrate to other areas, and even countries, in search of opportunity. Women will stay behind with the children, the sick and the elderly, and after some time will generally become sole providers for the family as male migrants settle permanently elsewhere. For subsistence, many women in mining-affected communities turn to the provision of low-paid support services for the mining economy, such as cooking and cleaning. They may also run shebeens, engage in sex work, and dire poverty may lead to the forced marriages of girls.37

These impacts are felt equally strongly, and may be more aggravated, in communities that have been relocated by the mining corporations. Legislation requires that companies compensate families with appropriate housing in the same or better condition as before. They are also expected to assist in the development of activities to guarantee food security. The reality, however, is that families are often moved to areas that lack the most basic infrastructure, where it is difficult or impossible to conduct farming for subsistence, and far from the towns where most employment opportunities are available. Women and girls are particularly vulnerable in these isolated locales as they must walk long distances to source food, water and wood, and are exposed to many risks, including rape. Reports from the communities of Cateme and Malaudzi note that women struggle to make mashambas38 leading to food shortage and therefore hunger. There are also accounts of girls leaving school because of long distances to travel and the incidences of rape along the way.39

Studies show that women suffer disproportionately as a result of the adverse effects of mining. Mozambique is not an exception.

37 Interview with Gizela Zunguze, Ibid.
38 Mozambican name for “small-holder farms.”
39 Interview with Gizela Zunguze, Ibid.
“Why do they ask if I tempted him?”

“Why do they ask what I was wearing?”

“Why do they say I asked for it?”

“Why do they ask what I was doing there?”
The research found limited information on the impact of militarisation on mining-affected communities. While this constraint can be attributed to a lack of prior interest in systematically documenting these aspects of mining-community relations, it is likely also influenced by the sensitive nature of the issue, particularly in contexts where company, state and community relations are tense.

Thus, the absence of relevant information ought not to be taken as the absence of fact. In fact, the research sources revealed some clues that are worth highlighting. As mentioned by different key informants interviewed, in most mining-affected areas tensions inevitably emerge between companies and communities. The Mozambican state, which should act as a mediator in the tension, is often very partisan, with government representatives occasionally labelling communities and organisations that challenge the actions of mining corporations as “anti-development”, and often sanctioning police, private security agents, and occasionally military actions targeted against members of mining-affected communities.

Restrictions on free movement, intimidation, and espionage are particularly frequent in communities that continue to live in the vicinity of mines, as is the case of Cassoca, circumscribed by the Jindal coal mine, as well as the community of Bagamoio adjacent to the Vale mine. In Nyamanhumbir (Cabo Delgado), where the Montepuez Ruby Mining operates, beyond private security agents, the police and the military play a key role in the protection of the company’s interests.

In 2017, a video leaked on the internet showed several officers of the Mozambican police torturing artisanal miners inside a ruby mine. Although the police assumed responsibility in this instance, events of this nature are recurrent in communities, but are often overlooked by the state and its agents. Several testimonials of members of mining impacted communities give accounts of police and private security agents destroying houses in the middle of the night, damaging property and taking possessions. While done under the guise of
maintaining law and order around the mining areas these actions are a means of protecting the interests of the companies against those of the communities.

During the two field visits conducted in communities living in the vicinity of mines it became clear that the companies and local authorities are preoccupied by the presence of ‘outsiders’ who may be able to report human rights violations.

With regards to the specific effects of militarisation on women, the information is even more scant, though there are reports that in some instances, women that live within mining areas or work in the mine as service personnel (e.g. for cleaning) are subjected to body searches before leaving the premises of the mine.43 Perhaps due to the existence of taboos around gender-based violence, violations of women and girls are not readily brought to the fore and certainly never reported.

Though limited in scope and breadth, the limited insights proffered here may provide useful points of departure for much needed in-depth research on the links between militarisation and violence against women in mining-affected communities in Mozambique.

43 Interview with Gizela Zunguze, ibid; interview with Flaida Macheze, ibid.
This paper indicates that there have been significant shifts in the Mozambican political economy and regulatory framework since the adoption of an extractivist framework guiding development choices in the early 2000s. The literature highlights that the rapid expansion of the mining sector has been met with a surge in mining-dependence, which has substantially altered the relationship between state, mining corporations and mining-affected communities. The sovereign debt crisis confronting the country is one of the grave consequences of a development model that has encouraged rent-seeking and forged a separation between the state and citizenry, in ways that benefit mining companies and state elites.

In this context, militarisation surges as a strategy for the state and mining companies to deal with conflicts and ‘manage’ the interests of communities throughout the various stages of implementation of mining projects. Despite scarce evidence about the impacts of militarisation – which could partly be attributed to the politically sensitive nature of the issues – this report highlights tendencies of surveillance, intimidation, restriction on assembly and free movement as well as sexualised violence that emanate from increased militarisation as well as securitisation affecting mining-affected communities, and women in particular.

With these limited but pertinent insights, this paper will hopefully serve as encouragement for the development of further research on the issues at hand. Specifically, given the lack of documented evidence, it is necessary to work closely with affected communities as well as local NGOs to unearth oral evidence that might provide better understanding of: 1) What constitutes militarisation; 2) What constitutes violence against women; 3) The interlinkages between militarisation and violence against women and the effects of this; and 4) Possibilities for collective resistance, care and alternatives that can be forged.
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Osório, Conceição & Teresa Cruz e Silva, 2017. Corporações Económicas e Expropriação: Raparigas, Mulheres e Comunidades Reassentadas no Distrito de Moatize.


Âurea Mouzinho

Coordenação da Pesquisa: Justiça Ambiental (JA) e WoMin

Edição de conteúdo e autora secundária: Shamim Meer
In societies across the world, women have an unfair burden of work. They are expected to perform household duties, take care of men, the children and the sick, and to make sure families are fed and clothed.